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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of minimum wage on the youth employment 
using panel technique in Iran’s manufacturing industries at the 4-digit aggregation level of ISIC classification, 
during 2001-2006. There is the controversy surrounding minimum wage because the effects of the 
introduction and increase of minimum wage may differ greatly depending on the labor market structure. In 
order to capture the effects which various un-observed labor supply and demand factors may have on the 
youth employment, The Kaitz Index (as the ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage) has been used in 
our analysis. The obtained results provide the small but positive effect of minimum wage on youth 
employment. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The impact of minimum wage legislation has been widely discussed and is a major concern among labor 
economists, especially the effect of minimum wage on the employment of youths-a major group that is 
influenced by such legislation. The negative employment effects of minimum wages were taken for granted 
for decades (Brown et al., 1982). Only in the 1990s was this consensus view challenged when several studies 
based on natural experiments demonstrated that minimum wage increases often had no negative 
employment effects and sometimes the effects were even positive (Card and Krueger, 1995). However, 
considerable debate about the relevance of the new view remains (Dolado et al., 1996; Neumark and 
Wascher, 2007). 
 
To some extent, this controversy appears to be justified because the effects which result from the 
introduction or increase of minimum wage differ from one country to another, depending both on the content 
and application of the approved legislation and the particular structure of the labor market. In a perfect 
competitive labor market, the introduction of a minimum wage would tend to reduce unemployment. But, in a 
monopsony structure of the labor market, the effect might well be the opposite (Blazquez et al., 2009).  These 
conflicting assessments on the effects of minimum wage are clearly revealed in many of the empirical studies 
devoted to the subject. Most pioneering works were primarily focused on the economy of the United States 
and based on a competitive structure of the labor market. They concluded that the existence of minimum 
wage had a negative effect on youth employment (Hashimoto and Mincer, 1970; Welch, 1974; Brown et al., 
1982; Hamermesh, 1985; Wellington, 1991; Neumark and Wascher, 1992; Deere et al., 1995; Currie and 
Fallick, 1996; Partridge and Partridge, 1998; Williams and Mills, 1998; Baker et al., 1999; Pereira, 2003; Yuen, 
2003; Neumark et al., 2004). Assuming the existence of a monopsony structure, other studies have provided, 
in contrast, evidence for the neutral, or even positive, effects of minimum wage on youth employment 
(Wellington 1991; Card, 1992a and 1992b, Katz and Krueger 1992, Card and Krueger 1994, Machin and 
Manning 1994; Card and Krueger, 1995; Manning and Machin, 1996; Dickens et al., 1998, 1999; Bhaskar & To, 
1999; Lang and Kahn, 1999). 
  
The present article deals with the impact of minimum wage on youth employment using Iran's manufacturing 
industries data during 2001-2006 at the 4-digit aggregation of International Standard Industrial Classification 
(ISIC). This paper is organized in five sections. After the introduction in the first section, section 2 provides a 
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summary review of literature on the subject. Section 3 presents model specification and data description. 
Section 4 considers the empirical results and finally a conclusion will be provided in section 5. 
 
2. Review of Literatures  
 
In general, the results obtained by the analytical works carried out for the last few decades in developed 
countries to measure the impact of minimum wage on the aggregate employment and unemployment tend to 
show negative elasticities in the estimated employment functions. This appears to be particularly the case 
when the minimum wage has been significantly increased or it has been initially established at a relatively 
high level (Blazquez et al., 2009). The analysis follows tends to discuss what some of the theoretical economic 
models tell us about the linkage between minimum wage and employment. This section starts by presenting 
the predictions of the basic version of the Competitive Model, namely the supply-demand model, which says 
that the minimum wage lowers the employment of minimum wage workers, because it establishes an 
“artificial wage-floor” which has nothing to do with the market requirements such as the prevailing 
productivity growth and unemployment rate. This will be followed by a discussion of the predictions of 
alternative model, as the Monopsony Model, which tell us that the link between minimum wage and 
employment might be positive. Other extensions have also emerged in the form of partial sector (in a two-
sector model), heterogeneous analyses and ‘shock Effects’ model. 
 
The competitive model: The most basic model of minimum wage effects on employment and unemployment 
focuses on a single competitive labor market. In this model of the market, the labor force is homogeneous. 
The demand for labor of the firm is a decreasing function of real wages (Fig. 1). The fixation of a minimum 
wage level above the equilibrium level, says Wc, would lead to a drop in the demand for labor, all things being 
equal. Then, the workers whose productivity is below the minimum wage are shut out of the labor market. 
 
Fig 1: The competitive labor market 
 
Source: Ghellab (1998) 
 
The monopsony model: Contrary to the predictions of the competitive model, under the hypothesis of the 
monopsony model, the negative relationship between minimum wage and employment is not proven. Such a 
relationship may be positive. The main postulate of the monopsony model is that employers have a certain 
market power in setting wages in such a way that labor supply is a positive function of the wages paid. This 
means that the higher the wages, the more abundant the labor force. In this context, the labor market is 
compared with that of a “one company town”, where there is only one buyer of labor. If an employer wants to 
attract the labor force in the town, say “the villagers”, he should pay higher wages. Higher wages, through the 
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setting up of a minimum wage, would help him to retain his workers, thus maintaining a higher level of 
employment (Ghellab, 1998). 
 
Two-sector Model: Minimum wage provisions in most countries, and particularly in the U.S., have 
historically granted exemptions based on industry and size, so coverage has not been universal. Besides 
partial coverage, labor economists have also pointed to the importance of noncompliance with the law 
(Brown, 1999). Both these realities provide the basis for a two-sector model, whose covered sector’s 
employment, like the model based on universal coverage, is affected by the minimum wage, while the 
uncovered sector’s demand for labor depends on the market –determined wage in that sector. Workers 
displaced by the minimum wage from the covered sector move to the uncovered sector, whose flexible5 wage 
falls as supply increases. However, since in response to the fall in wages in the uncovered sector, some of the 
displaced workers with higher reservation wages would still prefer not to work, it is clear, as Brown (1999) 
puts it, that activities in the uncovered sector may dilute but not totally eliminate the unemployment effects 
of the minimum wage (Edagbami, 2006). 
  
Heterogeneous labor model: This model was recently integrated into minimum wage analysis. Low-wage 
groups usually have in their fold (often doing the same tasks) other relatively skilled and better-paid workers 
who are only indirectly affected by the minimum wage. The members of this latter group are used as 
substitutes for workers directly affected by minimum wages, causing a decline in overall employment since it 
takes less than one skilled worker to substitute for one minimum wage worker, or to substitute one grade of 
labor for another. The danger in this is that the balance of overall unemployment effects of minimum wage 
may be small, leading erroneously to the policy conclusion that few low-skilled workers were hurt (Freeman, 
1996). Hence the justifiable focus on teenagers, blacks and females against, respectively, youth adults, whites 
and males, since the former group of workers has the highest concentration of the most disadvantaged 
(Brown, 1999). 
 
3. Model, Data, and Estimation Methodology 
 
The relevance of the effect of minimum wage on employment clearly varies according to the weight of the 
minimum wage relative to the average wage. As previous works have shown, the impact of minimum wage 
will be greater on a given wage distribution, the closer it is to the average wage. Evidence shows that when it 
is high, its impact is negative, while if it is low, the consequences of its introduction are negligible (Katz and 
Krueger, 1992). For this reason, the most common approach for examining the effects of the introduction and 
increase of minimum wage on employment on a territorial basis is to use the Kaitz Index (KI) which is defined 
as the ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage. An important reason for employing this index is that it 
makes possible to collect the non-observable labor supply and demand factors, because its denominator –the 
average wage- can be affected either by supply or demand shocks (Blazquez et al., 2009). As most academic 
works in the subject made clear, young people between 15 and 24 years of age usually have the lowest wages 
and, as a result, tend to be one of the most examined collectives in the empirical works aimed to study the 
impact of minimum wage on employment.  The following equation of youth employment is commonly used as 
the starting point for any theoretical framework aimed to analyze the impact of minimum wage on 
employment. 
),( ititit XKIFEM        (1) 
Where the sub-indexes i and t represent, respectively, the industry and time under study; EM the youth 
employment; KI the Kaitz index; and X captures a number of variables which affect both labour supply and 
demand. 
medW
W
KI min
        (2) 
Where 
minW  is the minimum wage per worked hour for full time workers and medW  the average wage per 
worked hour.  This study has used the model similar study by Blazquez et al. (2009) as following:  
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Whereas, (
itodPrlog ) shows the logarithm of labor productivity in industry i and at time t. The expected sign is 
negative, 
itVAlog  is the logarithm of real value added and itKlog  is the logarithm of real capital stock. The 
positive coefficients are expected for these variables. 
itHClog is the logarithm of human capital. Human capital 
can be as a special factor for a specific industry. Thus, the expected sign is negative. In this paper, HC 
calculated from skilful labor to total productive labor. In this paper, data was used at the 4-digit aggregation 
level of ISIC classification during 2001-2006 (due to lack of new data). Raw data collected from Center of 
Statistic of Iran. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
This paper has used a panel data regression model. Also, in order to select the appropriate method of 
estimation among OLS the pooled model, Fixed Effects (FE), and Random Effects (RE), we applied the Chow, 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) by Breusch-Pagan (1980) and Hausman tests using Stata 9.1 and Eviews 7. (For 
more details about panel data technique and the related tests, see Baltagi, 2008, Hsiao, 2005 and Gujarati, 
2004). Table 1 presents Chow, Lagrange Multiplier and Hausman tests for the model. 
  
Table 1: Chow, Lagrange Multiplier and Hausman Tests  
Result P-value Test-Statistic Test 
FE 0.0000 17.06 Chow 
RE 0.0000 274.17 LM 
FE 0.0000 132.86 Hausman 
 
The Chow test is a test for choosing between simple OLS regression and fixed effects that based on table 1 it 
shows that fixed effects is suitable model. Also, the LM test is to decide between random effects regression 
and simple OLS regression that result shows random effects regression is appreciated. To decide between 
fixed or random effects, Hausman test can be run a where the null hypothesis is that the preferred model is 
random effects vs. the alternative the fixed effects (Green, 2008). Based on information in table 1, the suitable 
model is fixed effects as presented in table 2. 
 
Table 2: Results of Estimation of Model 
 
Depended Variable:  log Productivity 
Prob. t-Statistic Coefficient Independent Variable 
0.0063 2.752091 9.15E-07 KI 
0.0000 -8.843616 -0.5523 LogProd 
0.0000 40.28263 0.9593 logVA 
0.0216 2.309582 0.0200 logK 
0.0196 -2.345918 -0.0391 logHC 
  319.78 F 
0.0000 P-value 
1.4941 D.W 
0.9857 R2 
0.9827 R2 Adjusted 
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Based on table 2, the coefficient of KI is positive and statistically significant, but this coefficient does not 
support the negative effect of minimum wage on youth employment. Also, the coefficient of logProd is 
negative and statistically significant with expected sign. The coefficients of logVA and logK are positive and 
significant with expected sign. The coefficient of logHC has the expected sign and is statistically significant. 
The F statistic indicates that all the coefficients in the model are different than zero and the model is 
statistically significant. Also, R-square shows the 98 percent of variance of dependent variable explained by 
independent variables. In sum, we can conclude that, according to these results, there is no evidence of any 
negative effect of minimum wage on youth employment for the period 2001-2006. There are, however, some 
indications of a slightly positive effect, a result which is consistent with other research on the subject (Card 
and Krueger, 1995; Dickens et al., 1998, 1999; Bhaskar & To, 1999; Lang and Kahn, 1999).  In fact, there are 
two reasons which help us to explain both the absence of any negative impact on youth employment and the 
lack of any increase in the youth unemployment. In the first place, the monopsony model indicates that for a 
monopsonist the increase of youth (minimum) wages tends to be accompanied by employment growth as the 
average cost for the employer is below the marginal cost. At the same time, there has been a significant 
increase in labor supply and there is high unemployment in Iran’s labor market that the more of these 
unemployed workers are young people that they are more inclined to accept any wage level offered to them 
(below the minimum wage) than the rest of the workers. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This study examined the effect of minimum wage on youth employment in Iran’s manufacturing industries at 
the 4-digit aggregation level of ISIC classification during 2001-2006. The results obtained do not provide 
sufficient evidence of any negative effect of minimum wage on youth employment in Iran’s manufacturing 
industries over the period under study. This result may appear to indicate the existence of a monopsony 
structure in the labour market. In other words, the obtained results provide the small but positive effect of 
minimum wage on youth employment. Therefore, the policy implication derived from this empirical study 
suggests that in the short run the minimum wage has no adverse effect on youth employment, however, the 
long-run effect of the minimum wage on youths may be large and harmful as the increasing early dropout of 
them from school into the labor market interrupts the accumulation of human capital and thus deters the 
long-run economic growth of the economy. Also, this policy can cause an increase of the unemployment rate, 
longer unemployment periods, and the rise of long-term unemployment. Thus, the minimum wage policies 
should be administered with great caution. 
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